Underlying the policy complexities of the pension issue is the background give and take of financial interests and political careers. General Treasurer Gina Raimondo, for example, is free to propose pretty much anything and let the General Assembly take the heat for actual changes. As long as she stays off the unions’ “not with a 10-foot pole” list, she can run for higher office as the stern-chinned pragmatist.
Similarly, Governor Lincoln Chafee can seek to burnish his “fiscal conservative” bona fides by publicly endorsing a plan more generally seen as Raimondo’s handiwork. For their part, legislative leaders can play off the treasurer’s supposedly objective calculations and the governor’s veto power. What the public is seeing and what elected officials are planning can be two very different policies.
An October 10 Providence Journal op-ed by National Education Association Rhode Island Executive Director Robert Walsh fits neatly into that interpretation:
The only equitable option presented to the pension advisory group was to make current retirees subject to the “Plan B Cost-of-Living Adjustment.” The Plan B COLA, already in place for current teachers and state employees, bases the COLA on the lesser of the rise in the Consumer Price Index or 3 percent, and it is further capped at the first $35,000 in pension earnings, which is also indexed to inflation. (The CPI is also used to calculate Social Security increases.) When combined with a more modest 25-year reamortization of the pension fund, the Plan B COLA option for retirees solves a significant part of the pension dilemma, unless the courts rule otherwise.
General Treasurer Gina Raimondo, to her credit, has allayed some fears already by strongly stating that no earned benefits would be cut, and that the debate regarding retirees would focus on the COLA. She has also wisely shown more openness to reamortization as part of a comprehensive solution to the pension issue.
Obviously, Treasurer Raimondo’s proposal (onto which the union-backed Governor Lincoln Chafee has signed) goes a bit farther than that, mainly in that it completely suspends COLAs pending the pension system’s healthy recovery, it introduces a hybrid defined-benefit/defined-contribution plan, and it adjusts the retirement age upwards to Social Security standards. (Keep in mind, by the way, that various categories of employees — teachers, public safety, and so on — receive differing treatment.)
Several components of the proposal are subject to basic mathematical negotiation, meaning that the sides will trade dollar amounts in order to secure principles that they want to protect. It’s useful, therefore, to consider COLAs, retirement age, and amortization in this context.
The “Plan B” COLA calculation to which Walsh refers follows the Consumer Price Index and is capped at 3%; it also applies only to $35,000 of the pension benefit (although that number adjusts upwards every year by CPI-to-3%, as well). Raimondo’s proposal replaces the CPI with the pension’s annual net return (over a five-year average), with the cap at a 4% increase. In terms of the actuarial calculations, the upshot is that this move reduces the predicted annual COLA from 2.35% to 2%. The sticking point is that the new proposal would withhold COLAs in any year that the system is less than 80% funded, which could mean a decade or more of no increases.
That aspect of the proposal, along with the increase in retirement age, are likely to be hotly contested. And since Raimondo has crossed the Rubicon of reamortization (thus extending the number of annual state budgets until the plan is fully funded, reducing the hit each year, but also reducing investment returns), it will appear more reasonable to extend the amortization period even farther in order to “buy back” reduced benefits. So, for example, advocates for retirees might accept the later retirement age but insist that the COLA pinch be eased, with the difference in costs made up with a few more years of amortization.
But this is all a numbers game. The interesting wild card is the hybrid plan, which reformers rightfully like as a means of shifting market risk away from taxpayers and toward retirees, but which contains details that ought to make them wary. Given the complexity of that topic, I’ll take it up in a separate post.