RHODE ISLAND CENTER FOR FREEDOM & PROSPERITY

P3 PayGo Model

How a True Public-Private-Partnership May be Best Approach to Fix RI's Transportation Infrastructure

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INTRODUCTION

Beginning this spring, Rhode Island Governor Gina Raimondo proposed a controversial RhodeWorks program to implement a toll system for commercial trucks as the foundation for a massive revenue bond that would not require voter approval. RhodeWorks is the governor's strategy for repairing and maintaining a statewide road and bridge system that is undeniably in poor condition.

Despite a report from an insider government vendor,[1] many are concerned that the governor's plan would place yet another tax on Rhode Islanders — in the guise of highway tolls — putting unnecessary downward pressure on an already depressed state economy and placing taxpayers and drivers at further risk for inevitable cost overruns.

More recently, to address this concern, a Republican Policy Group (RPG) of state lawmakers has proposed a pay-as-you-go (PayGo) alternative that would find an annual sum of money derived from cuts and reform to existing state expenditures in order to fund the annual cost.

The mission of the Rhode Island Center for Freedom and Prosperity is to advance market-based solutions for the Ocean State through a rigorous exchange of ideas, as well as to provide alternative perspectives in the debate about important public policy issues. We agree with the priority on infrastructure established by the governor and the RPG's directive to fund and build a sustainable repair and maintenance program within the state's already high tax and fee regime. However, with Rhode Island's infrastructure in such bad condition, a large up-front investment of money may be unavoidable.

The Center proposes an out-of-the-box concept for "delivery" of this massive public works project utilizing a proven model utilized in many other states for similar projects. Lawmakers should conduct the detailed due diligence necessary to properly consider a public-private-partnership (P3) delivery model, with a pay-as-you-go (PayGo) funding foundation.

All combined this approach would fund much needed infrastructure upgrades largely from existing general revenue, yet would offload the debt, risk, and delivery of the project to a private sector partner.

The P3 PayGo model would preclude the need for tolling and would provide substantial benefits for Rhode Island taxpayers and drivers by:

- Removing the risk of taxpayers' or ratepayers' bearing the burden of likely cost overruns
- Requiring no major new revenue streams, such as tolls, taxes, or fees
- Removing project management from the RI Department of Transportation (RIDOT), which has recently come under intense public criticism for ongoing internal inefficiencies
- Delivering bridge and road repairs in a more timely manner
- Potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars in overall project costs

Compiling this paper, the Center found the potential cost savings of a P3 PayGo project to be massive. However, the primary goals of this proposal are to allow an upfront infusion of money without the need for tolls or other new revenue or long-term general obligation debt and to mitigate the risk associated with a project of this size. We therefore consider cost savings to be a secondary benefit, with the expectation that the numbers will become clearer as the public debate proceeds. At the very least, it is clear that, like the state's bloated budget, P3 PayGo has plenty of slack to make the proposal feasible.

Important note: The term "public private partnership" is often used to describe government subsidies arbitrarily handed out to private ventures, such as 38 Studios. The P3 described in this paper is very different, with delivery of a vital public works project farmed out to a private sector partner in order to achieve market-based efficiencies and risk management not usually available to the government.

PURPOSE AND RECOMMENDATION

This fall and winter, public and/or backroom debate will be conducted to craft a funding plan to repair Rhode Island's decrepit transportation infrastructure. Unfortunately, as with most major public policy decisions that are made in our state, only one option or one side of the story appears to be on track to be seriously considered.

Governor Gina Raimondo's RhodeWorks RI plan, including a tolling and bonding strategy, appears to be that sole option under consideration, despite the fact that our Center and some lawmakers have proposed a PayGo approach to funding the necessary infrastructure upgrades.

Continued reliance on new revenue and added debt can create a vicious cycle from which the state and its economy may never recover. The RI Center for Freedom & Prosperity proposes consideration of an innovative, *virtuous*-cycle hybrid that would achieve the same ends without additional, potentially devastating, downward pressure on our state's struggling economy.

The purpose of this concept paper is to inject a compelling new option — *a non-traditional model for financing and delivery of vital infrastructure upgrades* — into this important public policy debate. An out-of-the-box option as far as Rhode Island politics is concerned, the P3 model discussed in this paper has saved taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars in other states throughout our nation and should be fully vetted and reported on this winter by lawmakers, economists, and financiers more expertly versed in such financial partnerships.

The Center further recommends that the state develop and implement a competitive process for such a P3 project as soon as possible so that more-specific and actual terms can be provided by interested private entities as a potential complement

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to the governor's project and the RPG funding plan in time for 2016 legislative consideration. A standard P3 process would begin with a request for qualifications (RFQ), which typically enables only the best-qualified private organizations to be asked to respond to future requests for proposal (RFPs).

In general, the figures and projections in this paper are based on actual data from a similar P3 project in Pennsylvania but are applied theoretically only. However, the massive potential fiscal, time, and safety savings should be compelling enough to aggressively pursue and debate this P3 model for Rhode Island.

Background

There is little argument that Rhode Island's bridge and road infrastructure is crumbling, imposing additional costs, inconveniences, and safety concerns on residents and businesses, disrupting existing economic activity, and creating an unattractive disincentive for new businesses to move or form, here.[2]

There is also little argument that Governor Raimondo is correct in prioritizing this issue as

worthy of immediate action in the form of a massive public-works project. Much is at stake.

Managed properly, the construction upgrades would be efficiently delivered in a cost-effective and timely manner, with virtually all Rhode Islanders enjoying the benefits of a more-modern and safer transportation infrastructure, with new jobs created for years, without further harming the state's economy or adding risk to taxpayers, drivers, or any specific industry sector.

Improperly managed, yet another over-budget, low-quality government boondoggle would waste hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars, benefitting the same special-interest insiders who have prospered from decades of mismanagement and corruption at the highly inefficient RI Department of Transportation (RIDOT).

Historically, the state government of Rhode Island has relied on general obligation bonds to fund road maintenance. Under Governor Lincoln Chafee, the state attempted to switch the emphasis on debt toward an emphasis on taxes and tolls — most notably with the costly and ultimately abandoned attempt to impose a new toll on the Sakonnet River Bridge, as a tax on the East Bay to push transportation revenue throughout the state.

To expedite her RhodeWorks project and to avoid giving the people of Rhode Island a vote on this massive new debt project, Governor Gina Raimondo has designed the borrowing to take the form of a "revenue bond," meaning that the debt will be tied to a dedicated source of revenue that the state presumably has a right to allocate for the payments. Specifically, in order to avoid the difficult decisions of setting budget and spending priorities with existing state funds, the revenue for the debt would come from a new series of tolls imposed across the state on trucks. Accurately estimating the effects of a targeted revenue source that is wholly new to the area would require not only estimates of the current amount of commercial traffic on Rhode Island's roadways, but also impossible predictions about the changes in behavior to which a tolling system would inevitably lead.

Moreover, not only would the tolling substructure itself add over $43 million to the cost, but Rhode Islanders would live under the constant fear that new tolls on them are always a single vote of the legislature away.[3]

ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT THE GOVERNOR'S PLAN

Is the governors "trucker toll" and public bond model — called RhodeWorks — the best approach? Or is there an alternative model that the Ocean State should consider?

Our Center and some lawmakers have previously advocated for a PayGo approach, wherein necessary upgrades are funded out of existing and planned general revenue by prioritizing spending on bridges and roads over other, non-essential budget programs, including many corporate welfare programs in the form of tax credits, eliminating the need for tolls and the high-interest costs associated with large government bonds. The Speaker of the RI House of Representatives, Nicholas Mattiello, quickly dismissed this model.

However, both the governor's goals and the RPG's funding approach can be mutually achieved if a new delivery model is considered. This policy concept paper will briefly explore that alternative model: a public-private-partnership, or P3, that in theory would deliver the very same infrastructure upgrades the governor envisions at a lower cost, in a more-timely manner, and at a higher quality.

The Pennsylvania Example

Such a model has been deployed in many states for similar major public-works projects, most recently in Pennsylvania, where the P3 model is being utilized for its Rapid Bridge Replacement Project to more-efficiently upgrade over 500 deficient bridges with a base construction cost of $899 million.[4]

The proposal that Governor Gina Raimondo is currently championing, which may be *the* major subject of the next session of the General Assembly, is a combination of new tolls and new debt. For a near-term infusion of resources to repair and rebuild bridges and fix roads, the governor proposes to borrow approximately a half-billion dollars, ultimately costing the state more than one billion dollars after interest and other associated costs are paid.

The governor's currently proposed bond-and-toll plan — passed in the Rhode Island Senate as S0997[5] — has a base program fund cost of $500 million, plus $43 million for tolling facilities, a $38.5 million debt service reserve, financing costs of $10.4 million, and $563.1 million in interest for the 30-year bond.[6] The annual debt service under this plan would be $38.5 million, but the RhodeWorks proposal calls for revenue and spending of $57.8 million.

Five major concerns with the governor's bond-and-toll plan are:

1. It extracts more money from the private sector and from an economy that cannot afford it, with no guarantee that such extractions will not increase in future years.
2. It rewards legislative negligence for not addressing critical infrastructure needs in the past.
3. It perpetuates the wasteful spending, cronyism, and bureaucratic failures rampant at the RIDOT.
4. It benefits Wall Street financiers with over $500 million in interest costs, which do not directly improve the quality of life for Ocean Staters.
5. It places RI taxpayers and ratepayers at even greater financial risk of bearing future responsibility for toll revenue shortfalls or project cost overruns.

Conversely, a P3 PayGo scenario addresses each of these five concerns and more. Highlights of P3 PayGo strategy as compared with the governor's proposed plan are as follows:

- No major new tolls, taxes, or fees on drivers, taxpayers, or in-state businesses
- Transfer of project management away from corrupt and wasteful RIDOT to a responsible private partner that is made accountable by its very need to remain solvent
- Transferring 100% of the risk of cost overruns to the private sector
- An accelerated project completion schedule, to three-to-five years, from 10 years
- Possible inclusion of contractual road maintenance for 25 years or the life of the contract, with the State of Rhode Island still owning all bridges and roads
- A potential reduction of the core project's cost to $268 million from the $543 million price tag under the governor's government-centric model
- Possible reduction in the annual payment by the state, on average, from $57.8 million per year as low as $19 million per year

Note: While the Center and many others do not recommend it, the P3 delivery model could be funded by tolling revenue.

ELIMINATING RISK WITH A P3 STRATEGY

What Is a P3?

As described by the Surety & Fidelity Association of America and the American Insurance Association: [7]

> A P3 is a long-term contractual agreement between a public entity and a private partner in which the private partner, in exchange for compensation, invests its own assets and delivers a public service or facility. In such agreements, the public entity grants the exclusive rights ("concession") to the private partner ("concessionaire") to engage in an activity that would otherwise be a public responsibility and compensates the private partner.

The private partner, based on contracted state payments, would secure the necessary near-term funds and assume the responsibility for upgrading and maintaining the designated roadways and bridges.

Many states, including the current Rapid Bridges Replacement Project in Pennsylvania, have looked to the private sector to plan and execute certain major public works projects in a more-efficient manner than government can otherwise manage. Under the Pennsylvania P3 scenario, the large backlog of repairs to structurally deficient or worn down bridges and roads could be more effectively and efficiently reduced.

In the case of the Pennsylvania Rapid Bridge Replacement Project, Plenary Walsh Keystone Partners won the competitive process and financed the project through a $721.5 million tax-exempt private activity bond (PAB) issue (the largest in U.S. history) along with $59 million of equity investment. This strategy obviates the need for new direct debt for the state and limits the indirect debt to the predictable annual payments covered through reprioritized spending.

Given the state of Rhode Island's high level of indebtedness, combined with the highly inefficient track record, and the special-interest-insider nature of the RIDOT, along with Governor Gina Raimondo's well-placed priority to upgrade the state's crumbling bridge and road infrastructure, the Ocean State would appear to be an ideal P3 candidate.

A P3 would effectively eliminate the possibility of cost overruns that may need to be funded by taxpayers by transferring nearly 100% of the financial risk to the private sector.

Under a P3 model, the infrastructure upgrade project would be delivered in a manner that would leverage the private sector's natural advantages versus government bureaucracy: increased innovation, safer and more cost-effective construction, more timely delivery, and procurement efficiencies of scale.

Perhaps more importantly, a P3 strategy would effectively eliminate the possibility of cost overruns that may need to be funded by taxpayers by transferring nearly 100% of the financial risk to the private sector.

Lower Project Costs

Via an open and competitive RFP process, the state of RI would select the best proposal and enter into a long-term P3 contract with a private venture corporation that would be contractually responsible for providing the same infrastructure upgrades currently under consideration by the RIDOT, in exchange for a series of fixed payments over the life of the contract.

State policymakers would identify and enact strategic reductions in other areas of spending, shifting priorities appropriately toward the basic public service of transportation infrastructure, in order to fund the contractually guaranteed payments to the private sector contractor. Some revenue may also be derived from increased truck registration fees, if necessary for political reasons.

Increased private sector efficiencies lead to lower costs. By allowing a private-sector entity to manage the project, as compared with the highly inefficient RIDOT, significant cost efficiencies can be realized in the areas of innovation, execution, and procurement. Based on discussions with staff of Plenary Walsh Keystone Partners, the private partner in Pennsylvania, these efficiencies were estimated to save 33% on final delivery costs of the project, as compared with the wasteful spending practices and low-value delivery boondoggles for which the RIDOT has become infamous.

While that percentage savings may sound optimistic, we have no reason to challenge it, especially for the purposes of illustration. In fact, a recently released report performed for the State of Rhode Island by Gordon Proctor & Associates found that, although Rhode Island's DOT employed nearly as many project development staff as comparable departments in other states, its annual spending on private consultants was over 30% of construction expenditures, compared with 4–12% in the other states.[8] In terms of dollars, that $45.6 million annual expense could reasonably be dropped to $5.4-17.3 million with competent management.

A project the size of RhodeWorks is either a huge opportunity to realize savings or a terrible risk of wasting taxpayers' money. A contract with a private partner could hold the company to plausible — rather than wasteful — benchmarks.

If the P3 arrangement were to achieve the 33% estimate, the private sector efficiencies could reduce the base construction costs of the RhodeWorks project to $335 million. The savings could either reduce the annual cost of the program or expand the amount of repair and maintenance that the DOT could perform.

Removing Regulatory Mandates Could Further Reduce Costs

In order to make the project even less costly, the state could also agree to provide the private contractor with a suite of exemptions from some of the more burdensome local rules and regulations that drive up costs, that limit the number of available sub-contractors, and that serve to enrich insider special interests. Although such a move would surely be controversial, it would not be unheard of.[9]

While not the norm with other P3 projects across the nation, the Center suggests that the Rhode Island General Assembly consider a case-specific exemption from project labor agreements (PLAs), minimum apprenticeship requirements , and "prevailing wage" laws that, with the guidance from the RI Association of Builders and Contractors , the Center estimates could collectively save Ocean State taxpayers up to another 20% of costs, or around $67 million. With these exemptions, the contractor could hire subcontractors at market rates, avoiding existing closed-shop and artificially inflated wage requirements.

Importantly, in order for the modified RhodeWorks project to realize savings from these exemptions, the private-sector partner would have to secure a taxable private-sector bond — rather than a tax-exempt PAB authorized by the federal government — which would avoid mandates of the federal Davis-Bacon Acts.[10] The option to evaluate this trade-off should be provided for would-be partners bidding on the long-term contract, based on their unique practices and resources. The choice between higher interest rates of taxable corporate bonds versus the tax-exempt PABs with lower construction and delivery costs could be one area of differentiation in the bidding process, and should be encouraged.

No Gantry Substructure Costs

Either way, under a P3 PayGo scenario, the state would save additional money by avoiding implementation costs for toll gantries and related infrastructure and administration. Without the need for tolls, $43 million in such substructure costs would be eliminated.

Combined with the lower private sector delivery costs, the suggested legislative exemptions, and the elimination of gantry construction, the PayGo P3 strategy could save approximately $275 million on the basic costs of construction and toll infrastructure.

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Lower Overall Financing Costs

Compared with the governor's plan, the significantly lower base construction cost under a P3 scenario would lead to a lower amount to be bonded. The corresponding interest costs would therefore be lower, despite a potentially higher interest rate.

For our purposes, as explained below, we assume that the governor's estimated 5% interest rate can be achieved even through a private bonding process. Adding estimated financing costs and debt service reserves to the $268 million core project cost suggests total borrowing of $293 million. Using the governor's assumptions would yield approximately $277 million in interest, or a total project cost of $570 million, compared with the governor's proposed $1,155 million.

Governor Raimondo's plan assumes a 5% interest rate, while the current Pennsylvania P3 PAB has a true interest cost (TIC) of 4.098%.[11] As with any debt, timing is a major consideration, as interest rates shift. Apart from timing, however, Governor Raimondo's plan to finance RhodeWorks using revenue bonds premised on new revenue from tolls may allow her administration to avoid a ballot vote, as required for regular debt under the Rhode Island constitution, but it comes with a cost.

Revenue bonds, technically, are not backed by the full faith and credit of the taxpayers of Rhode Island, so risk is higher, meaning that lenders can demand higher interest rates. That is why, for example, buyers of the bonds issued to pay for Rhode Island's ill-fated 38 Studios investment were able to demand up to 7.75% return on their investment.[12]

Either way, the interest rate will therefore be heavily dependent on the specifics of the players and of the deal. For some sense of the comparison, as of this writing, the composite yield on a 20-year A-grade corporate bond is 4.20, compared with 3.70 for municipal bonds.[13] However, viewed over an entire month, the municipal yield increases much more than the corporate yield, leaving a difference of just 18 basis points. The difference may therefore be negligible, and in any event, the governor's assumed 5% rate could prove conservative even for corporate bonds.

Additionally, as in Pennsylvania, the private corporation may also choose to sell private equity stakes in the venture. Any private equity investment

would require a separately negotiated repayment and dividend schedule that would likely be greater than the PAB TIC, because equity partners are normally last to be repaid in the event of a default. However, the equity piece of any arrangement could be as large or small as makes sense for the contractor's plan.

Savings of Time and Risk

With the innovation and execution efficiencies that can be achieved by a private sector partner, the completion time for the project could also be dramatically reduced with the incentive of an upfront milestone payment schedule from the state. In Pennsylvania, the private sector set a goal of completing the work of the massive project in three years, as opposed to the 10–15 years estimated under government management, with milestone payments paid over those three years.[14]

Additionally, with a performance-based P3 contract, taxpayers or ratepayers in Rhode Island are saved from any possibility of additional fiscal responsibility for the project. Nearly 100% of the risk of cost overruns is borne by the private sector.

ANNUAL PAYMENTS

The governor's plan requires nearly $60 million per year in new revenue — mostly from trucker tolls — collected by the state. This includes a contingency fund of 20% to cover cost overruns. Even beyond that amount, however, the governor's proposal calls for toll revenue that is 50% greater than total debt service, with no clear reason. This discrepancy should be more thoroughly explored.

Under a P3 scenario, because the risk for the project is transferred from the taxpayer to the private sector, the contingency fund would not be needed (or at least would be a negotiable piece of each private proposal), saving truckers and taxpayers money.

Based on the core project and financing costs described in the text above and in the table below, the annual payment required from the State of Rhode Island could (remarkably) be as low as $19 million. Of course, a company would have to build profit into its proposal, but depending how the private partner is structured, some or all of the profit could come through performance of the work. In any event, the $19 million should be considered to be the floor, with a very large margin for increases before its cost matches that of the governor's proposal. Again, our primary goals are to allow an upfront infusion of money based on annual PayGo revenue and to offload risk from the taxpayer.

If Rhode Island agrees to similar milestone payments to those built into the Pennsylvania deal (also proportional), additional payments of approximately $22 million would be made for each of the first three years.

If necessary, the state could implement some minor, specific increases in trucker licensing and other fees, to which commercial truck drivers have suggested they may be amenable. These fees would be directly tied to the larger project and would be guaranteed not to change.

Under a P3 PayGo scenario, state revenue to make these annual payments are to be made from general revenue — derived by cuts to existing, non-essential spending programs — and minimally complemented by some increase in annual trucker registration fees. These freed-up resources and new fees would be offered as a guaranteed source of annual revenue for the P3 partner.

Under a PayGo funding scenario, state policymakers would identify and enact strategic reductions in other areas of spending, shifting priorities appropriately toward the basic public service of transportation infrastructure, in order to fund the contractually guaranteed payments to the private sector contractor.

CONCLUSION

Considering the interests of Rhode Island taxpayers and drivers, a P3 delivery model to implement necessary transportation infrastructure upgrades could deliver repairs in a much more timely manner, remove the need for tolls, and most importantly, would remove the potential burden of cost overruns or revenue shortfalls from Rhode Islanders' shoulders and transfer this risk to a more efficient private sector partner. As a secondary benefit, a dramatically lower cost structure, as detailed in the following table, could realistically be predicted:

Hypothetical Cost Structure for a P3 PayGo RhodeWorks Project (millions)	
Program funds	$268
Tolling facilities	$0
Debt service reserve	$19
Financing costs	$6
Annual payment	$19
Total interest	$277
Total project cost	$570

Note: These numbers are for illustration only, extrapolated under maximum savings assumptions. The primary objectives of the P3 PayGo proposal are to allow an upfront infusion of money based on annual PayGo revenue and to offload risk from the taxpayer.

SUGGESTED NEXT STEPS

1. The RIDOT should be directed to develop an open and competitive bidding process for a P3 for the governor's RhodeWorks project.
2. Rhode Island lawmakers should draft and prepare legislation that would:
   a. Enable a P3 model for this project
   b. Provide exemptions to any state-level prevailing wage, apprentice, or PLA regulations
   c. Not require the private partner to obtain federal bonds, allowing the P3 partner to determine whether the delivery cost savings that can be negotiated through use of privately issued corporate bonds are greater than the financing cost savings from federally issued PABs
3. Political leaders should commit to funding all contractual P3 payments almost entirely out of existing revenue, bolstered only by potential increases to trucker vehicle registration fees.
4. RIDOT should negotiate a waiver from the Federal Highway Administration that expedites the permitting process by allowing it to delegate the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation to the private partner

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[1] Raimondo administration press release, "REMI Study Confirms RhodeWorks Will Add Thousands of Jobs, Boost Rhode Island's Economy." October 8, 2015. Available at: www.ri.gov/press/view/25993 (Accessed 10/14/15)

[2] RI Center for Freedom & Prosperity. "Report Card on Rhode Island Competitiveness." 2014. Available at: rifreedom.org/RIReportCard (Accessed 10/12/15)

[3] An unsigned editorial in the *Warwick Beacon* is one example illustrating that this concern is real. "Finding a path forward on roads, bridges vital to RI." *Warwick Beacon.* June 23, 2015. Available at: warwickonline.com/stories/Finding-a-path-forward-on-roads-bridges-vital-to-RI,103518 (Accessed 10/12/15)

[4] William Reinhardt, "Public Works Financing Exclusive: Rapid Bridges Financial Close a Game Changer." April 24, 2015. National Council for Public-Private Partnerships. Available at: www.ncppp.org/public-works-financing-exclusive-rapid-bridges-financial-close-a-game-changer (Accessed 10/13/15)

[5] 2015 S0997 Substitute A. "An Act Related to Motor and Other Vehicles – Bridge and Turnpike Authority – Tools." Senator Dominick Ruggerio, prime sponsor. Available at: webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText15/SenateText15/S0997A.pdf (Accessed 10/13/15)

[6] See table titled "Debt Service – RhodeWorks Bond" on p. 5: www.dot.ri.gov/documents/news/RhodeWorksFacts_June17_2015.pdf (Accessed 10/13/15)

[7] "Bonding P3 Projects." The Surety & Fidelity Association of American dn the American Insurance Association. Available at: c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.surety.org/resource/collection/73672F79-BC99-45A3-BCD0-FB3EFF8080BA/P3-FAQs.pdf (Accessed 10/13/15)

[8] Gordon Proctor & Associates, *RIDOT Project Development Analysis.* July 24, 2015.

[9] Andy Koenig, "A Disgraceful Labor Law Ripe for Repeal." *The Wall Street Journal.* September 24, 2015. Available at: www.wsj.com/articles/a-disgraceful-labor-law-ripe-for-repeal-1443136899 (Accessed 10/14/15)

[10] To finance the Pennsylvania Rapid Bridge Replacement plan, the PA state government obtained the authority for its private partner to secure up to $1.2 billion in PABs from the federal government. Because the PA project was federally backed, it was therefore subject to the federal prevailing wage law known as Davis Bacon Act, and not PA state prevailing wage law.

[11] Plenary Group. "Pennsylvania Rapid Bridge Replacement Project." March 18, 2015. Available at: rifreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/PA-Rapid-Bridge-Raplacement-Deal-Summary_v08.pdf (Accessed 10/15/15)

[12] Lisa Allen, "Rhode Island default on 38 Studios debt a real threat." April 11, 2014. Available at: www.thedeal.com/content/restructuring/rhode-island-default-on-38-studios-debt-a-real-threat.php (Accessed 10/13/15)

[13] Yahoo Finance, "Composite Bond Rates." Available at: finance.yahoo.com/bonds/composite_bond_rates (Accessed 10/13/15)

[14] Melissa Daniels, "$1B Rapid Bridge Replacement Across Pa. Aims for Savings, Safety." July 26, 2015. Available at: triblive.com/news/allegheny/8749128-74/bridges-bridge-plenary#ixzz3kh2ls61T (Accessed 10/13/15)